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Abstract
We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with n identical buyers and a seller who initially
commits to some capacity. Sales are sequential and each price is determined by strategic bargaining. A
unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists. It is characterized by absence of costly bargaining delays and
each trade is settled at a diﬀerent price. Prices increase with n and fall in the seller’s capacity, so if buyers
have signiﬁcant bargaining power, then the seller will strategically constrain capacity to less than n.T h u s ,
despite the eﬃciency of the bargaining solution, certain distributions of bargaining powers give rise to an
allocative ineﬃciency.
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DMS-0437210.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies short-run equilibrium in a market where several buyers desire to trade with a
seller who can costlessly produce a ﬁxed number of homogeneous goods. Our main objective is
to determine equilibrium volume of trade and sale price(s), when the seller initially commits to a
productive capacity and subsequently negotiates over the terms of trade. We also wish to demon-
strate how in such situations allocative ineﬃciency may emerge even if bargaining ineﬃciencies,
externalities or hold-up problems are not present.
Though the model can be applied to a variety of economic situations, the application that we
have in mind is that of a labor market. This is a natural setting because in the short run the number
of vacancies created by ﬁrms is ﬁxed and each ﬁrm generally deals with multiple job applicants
through a process that often involves wage negotiations. In this context, short-run simply means
a situation in which workers cannot apply to another ﬁrm, so they are temporarily ‘locked-in,’
and on the other hand the ﬁrm cannot vary the number of vacancies originally advertised. Several
interesting questions present themselves in such a setting. Can the ﬁrm pay lower wages, and
increase proﬁts, by restricting vacancies? Would this lead to bargaining ineﬃciencies? Are all
workers hired at the same wage?
To provide an answer we develop a strategic bargaining game between a central player (a
s e l l e ro raﬁrm) and n peripheral players (customers or workers) each of whom desires a single
indivisible object (a good or a job). The game is of complete information and is sequential, with
two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the seller commits to supply at most c ≤ n objects, a choice that we
call “capacity.” Capacity is costlessly created (so holdup problems are excluded) and production
is also costless. In the second stage a discrete-time alternating oﬀers game takes place, in the
tradition of [13]. The key features are that customers are served sequentially, selling one good a
time, players are randomly selected to make or respond to oﬀers, and there is a cost to bargaining
due to discounting in the form of a random stopping rule.
Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, for any given choice of capacity c,t h eb a r -
gaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Bargaining equilibrium is characterized
by absence of delays, due to discounting. Also, sale prices are decreasing functions of capacity,
due to the random oﬀer process. Intuitively, buyers who hesitate to purchase may be excluded
from future rounds of negotiations. It follows that if c<n , then buyers face consumption risk
because there is excess demand. The higher is capacity, the lower is this risk, and so the lower is
the customers’ reservation price. This leads to a second ﬁnding.
Endogenous capacity constraints arise in equilibrium if the seller has a suﬃciently limited
bargaining power. This means that allocative ineﬃciency can result even if the bargaining solution
is eﬃcient and there are no hold-up problems from investing in capacity. The reason is simple.
By restricting capacity below n the seller can raise buyers’ reservation prices by forcing them
to compete for scarce goods. This bargaining tactic improves the ﬁrm’s ability to obtain more
favorable terms of trade in each transaction, but it is costly in terms of lower trade volume.
Hence, equilibrium capacity constraints arise only if the seller is a suﬃciently poor negotiator.
1Interestingly, there are never bargaining delays, even with capacity constraints, so equilibrium
ineﬃciency is simply tied to the deadweight loss from the ﬁrm’s choice to supply less than what
is demanded.
In the paper we also characterize the ‘dynamics’ of the terms of trade, i.e., how equilibrium
sale prices vary as a function of the remaining inventory. Discounting is a source of sale price
heterogeneity but not the only one. Without excess demand, c = n, equilibrium prices fall in
the order of sale because customers who buy leave the store, which decreases competition among
the remaining customers. Hence, prices monotonically fall in the order of sale and early buyers
pay a premium simply due to discounting. In fact, this feature changes if there is excess demand,
c<n . As items are sold, consumption risk increases for the remaining buyers, and this dominates
the eﬀect of discounting when many buyers chase few goods. Indeed, we ﬁnd that with moderate
excess demand sale prices are U-shaped in the order of sale, while if excess demand is extreme,
then sale prices monotonically rise.
These results complement a literature on bargaining under complete information. In particular,
our study extends models in which a central player bargains with many others (e.g., see [2], [8],
[9] or [15]), by adding an initial stage of capacity choice. We also contribute to broaden previous
studies of bargaining tactics that can be used, prior to negotiations, to strengthen a player’s
bargaining position.2 We have found that the ability to restrict capacity, before negotiations
start, can be eﬀe c t i v ei nr a i s i n gt h es e l l e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ only if his ‘bargaining skills’ are suﬃciently
poor. Finally, our study oﬀers an interesting reassessment of the link between bargaining and
allocative eﬃciency. Generally, if an equilibrium without bargaining delays exists, then it is also
eﬃcient. Our model, too, generates no equilibrium delays but ineﬃciency may nevertheless arise
if the seller chooses to constrain capacity. A central message is that, though the distribution of
bargaining power does not impact bargaining eﬃciency, it can aﬀect allocative eﬃciency (see also
[3]).
In terms of its applicability, our bargaining model can be readily adopted to determine short-
run prices in search and matching frameworks of labor and goods markets. In a labor market
context, for instance, in the short-run ﬁrms and job seekers are often assumed to be locked-in,
in the sense that additional vacancies cannot be created and additional ﬁrms cannot be readily
contacted (e.g., [1]). Our framework can be used to determine wages at each ﬁrm, based on match-
speciﬁc factors such as the ratio of applicants to available vacancies. This may help explain some
of the residual wage heterogeneity that is observed in the data (e.g. see [4])
2Examples are found in [7], [11] and [12]. In particular, [7] study the optimal choice of debt by a ﬁrm prior
to wage negotiations with workers. Choosing a higher debt before bargaining may be advantageous to the ﬁrm,
a st h es i z eo ft h ec a k es h r i n k s . T h eﬁrm employs this tactic when it is not a skilled negotiator. The studies in
[11] and [12] consider a two-player one-cake bargaining problem in which both players, before negotiations, make
partial commitments (that can be revoked later at some cost) to some share of the cake which they would like to
get. In that setting players with higher concession costs obtain a higher share of the pie; thus taking actions —prior
to bargaining— that increase the concession cost may improve a player’s payoﬀ. The study in [5] obtains a similar
qualitative result in a diﬀerent setting. Other related models are [6] and [10].
2The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment and studies
the bargaining game. Section 3 studies the choice of capacity. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model and equilibrium concept
We study a game of complete information between a seller and n ≥ 1 identical buyers. These
buyers are present at the store (or matched to the seller) and each of them desires to consume
a single good. There are two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the seller can costlessly choose capacity
c =1 ,...,n. This allows the seller to produce, at no cost, up to c units of an indivisible homogeneous
good. Alternatively, we can consider c as the initial inventory (costlessly) selected by the seller.
In the second stage, goods are oﬀered for sale one at a time, and trading takes place by means of
a bargaining mechanism described below. Consumption utility is one for buyers and zero for the
seller and since utility is transferable there are gains from trade.
We say that a seller is capacity constrained when c<nand unconstrained otherwise. Also, we
deﬁne the excess demand to be n − c. We adopt subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept,
moving backward in our analysis. That is, in the next three subsections we ﬁx c in order to study
the bargaining outcome in the second stage of the game. Then, in the remaining section, we move
on to study the ﬁrst stage of the game and the optimal choice c.
2.1 The bargaining game
Consider the second stage of the game, i.e., the bargaining game. Suppose the seller has c =1 ,...,n
indivisible goods available. Every player observes c and n and then a trading process starts, which
is based on a noncooperative sequential bargaining game of complete information, in the tradition
of [13]. Negotiations take place in rounds indexed t =1 ,2,....I ne a c hr o u n dt the seller bargains
over the sale of a single good as follows. First, a random selection device chooses a buyer with
equal probability among all n present. Second, either the seller or the buyer are randomly selected
to propose an oﬀer q ∈ [0,1]. It is assumed that with probability γ ∈ (0,1) the proposer is the seller
and the responder is the buyer, and the converse occurs with probability 1−γ. We interpret γ as
a parameter representing the seller’s negotiation skill and denote the elements of the responder’s
action set by ‘accept’ or ‘reject.’
There is disagreement if the responder rejects the oﬀer q. In that case, the seller keeps the
good, all players earn zero utility for the round and remain matched to the seller. If there is
agreement, instead, trade occurs so the buyer earns utility 1 − q and leaves the store, while the
seller earns utility q. The remaining n − 1 buyers receive zero utility and remain at the store.
At the end of round t, if the seller has no more goods to oﬀer then the game stops, otherwise
the game continues with probability β ∈ (0,1). This random element, which we will refer to as
trading risk, makes bargaining delays costly to both buyers and seller. Of course, we can interpret
β simply as a discount factor, without loss in generality. As the game progresses to a new round,
the seller’s initial capacity c falls at most by one unit. Since goods are homogeneous, without loss
in generality we let i =1 ,...,c denote the good oﬀered for sale in round t ≥ i.
3Realized payoﬀs are as follows. Let s =0 ,1,...,cdenote the number of goods sold by the end
of the game. If s =0 , then every player realizes zero payoﬀ.I f s>1 then players that do not
trade realize zero payoﬀ.T od i s c u s st h ep a y o ﬀs of those who successfully traded assume the game
stops at the end of round t ≥ s.L e tqi denote the sale price of a good when the seller has c−i+1
goods for sale, in round t ≥ i,w i t hi =1 ,...,s.T h e n
 s
i=1 qi is the seller’s realized payoﬀ and
1 − qi is the payoﬀ realized by the buyer of the ith good.
2.2 Bargaining: the main result
Fix c =1 ,...,n. We start this section by reporting the main result for the bargaining game, which
consists of a full characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) oﬀers and realized
payoﬀs.
Theorem 1 The bargaining game between n ≥ 1 buyers and a seller with c =1 ,...,n goods has
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that is characterized as follows. The seller always oﬀers to
trade good i at price qs















Each buyer always oﬀers to purchase good i at price
qb
i = αqi (c,n)
and accepts any oﬀer q ≤ qi (c,n).
The theorem tells us that in equilibrium there are no bargaining delays and a good is sold in
each bargaining round, until the game stops randomly or the capacity is exhausted. In what follows
we prove this theorem via several steps in the form of lemmas. The layout is the following. We
will start by conjecturing the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium that satisﬁes some basic
properties, namely, oﬀers are stationary and are accepted without delay. Then we will calculate
such oﬀers and verify that they are indeed subgame perfect. Finally we show that our conjecture
is the unique SPE by demonstrating that all SPE of this game satisfy the properties above.
To start, consider an equilibrium characterized by two properties. First, there is no delay, i.e.,
in equilibrium any oﬀer is accepted in the same round in which it is made. Second, equilibrium
oﬀers are stationary, i.e., player types do not modify their oﬀe r sf o rag o o dt h a tw e n tu n s o l di n
the previous round.
Suppose the game has reached some round t ≥ i and that the seller is oﬀering the ith good.
Denote by Ai the set of buyers who are matched to the seller and desire to purchase the good. We
have |Ai| = n − i +1since in previous rounds i − 1 buyers have traded with the seller, consumer
4and the left. Given stationarity, let qs
k,i (c,n) denote the equilibrium oﬀer of the seller to buyer
k ∈ Ai and let qb
k,i(c,n) denote the equilibrium oﬀer of buyer k to the seller, given initial demand
n and capacity c. Throughout the paper, we will omit the arguments c and n, when they are
understood.
Given no delay in accepting oﬀers, let πi(c,n) denote the seller’s expected earnings from bar-








With probability γ the seller gets to make the oﬀer and buyer k ∈ Ai is selected to receive it with
probability 1
n−i+1. When the oﬀer is accepted without delay, the seller enjoys qs
k,i utility and the
buyer 1−qs
k,i. Similarly with probability
1−γ
n−i+1 some buyer k ∈ Ai gets to make an oﬀer, in which
case the seller’s utility is qb
k,i and the buyer is 1 − qb
k,i.
The seller’s payoﬀ in the bargaining game is simply the expected utility from selling at most c






and note that the probability of continuation of the game, β,a c t sa sad i s c o u n tf a c t o r .
Now consider buyer k.L e tuk,i(c,n) denote his expected utility at the start of some trading
round t ≥ i in which good i is oﬀered for sale, given initial demand n and capacity c. Considerations









The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side refer to the contingency in which buyer k is selected
to currently receive or make an oﬀer. The third term represents a continuation payoﬀ.D u e t o
random selection, n−i
n−i+1 is the probability that the buyer is excluded from this bargaining round.
This generates trading risk because, even if the seller has some remaining capacity, good i +1
will be oﬀered for sale only with probability β < 1.T h en o t a t i o nuk,i+1 ≥ 0 denotes the expected
utility from continuing the game, with uk,c+1(c,n)=uc+1(c,n)=0for all k ∈ Ac (and note that
Ac  = ∅ since c ≤ n). The buyer’s payoﬀ in the bargaining game is therefore uk,1,w h i c hc a nb e
obtained by backward iteration.
We are now ready to discuss best responses. Players choose oﬀers on [0,1] to maximize their
payoﬀs and clearly have an incentive to reach agreement as quickly as possible. Indeed, suppose
that round t = i results in disagreement between the seller and a buyer k ∈ Ai. Given stationarity
and absence of future delays, the seller’s continuation payoﬀ is βπi and the buyer’s is βuk,i.
Therefore any player accepts an oﬀer that is above or his continuation payoﬀ, is indiﬀerent if the
oﬀer corresponds to his continuation payoﬀ, and rejects it, otherwise.
Now observe that uk,i is linearly decreasing in qb
k,i and πi is linearly increasing in qs
i. Therefore,
an oﬀer is individually optimal only if it gives the opponent exactly his continuation payoﬀ, i.e. if






identify the best responses of buyer k and of the seller.
A ﬁrst result is that, given no delay and stationarity, the seller’s makes identical oﬀers to any
buyer k and every buyer k makes the same oﬀer to the seller.


























Proof. Consider bargaining over good i =1 ,...,c. The right hand side of (3) is not a function
of k and so qb
k,i = qb









Use backward induction on i. Start with i = c in which case uk,c+1 = uc+1 =0by deﬁnition.





n−i+1−βγ for all k. For the induction step, suppose qs
k,i+1 = qs
i+1
for some i<c−1. Then, (4) implies uk,i+1 = ui+1 for all k ∈ Ai+1. Therefore, using (9) we have
qs
i,k = qs
i for all k ∈ Ai.
Having established that oﬀers are symmetric, we have πi = γqs
i +( 1− γ)qb
i.T h u s ,w ec a nu s e
(3) to obtain (5) and (2). From (5) and symmetry, expression (9) gives us (6). Finally, use (5)-(6)
and the deﬁnitions of πi and uk,i to obtain (7)-(8).
This lemma establishes that, when making oﬀers, the seller treats each buyer identically and
vice-versa. Buyers oﬀer a fraction α of what the seller would oﬀer. This fraction is constant across
bargaining rounds, it does not depend on i,a n dg r o w sw i t hγ and β.
We can now obtain an expression for the buyer’s payoﬀ and the equilibrium oﬀer a function of
parameters. Of course, this generates expressions for πi and qb
i as functions of parameters.



















for all i =1 ,...,c.I np a r t i c u l a r ,qi (c,n) ∈ (0,1) for all i.



























We will omit the arguments, when understood.
From (7) recall that α
βqs
j is the seller’s equilibrium expected surplus in round j>iof bargaining.
Thus 1− α
βqs
i is the expected surplus to the buyer of good i and Φi+1 is the expected future surplus
to buyers, from the sales of goods i +1through c.






For the induction step suppose ui+1 =
Φi+1








because of (14). This gives us (10).
To ﬁnd an expression of Φi (c,n) in terms of the parameters, we use backward induction on i.








w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e d( 6 )w i t huc+1 =0for qs
c. For the inductive step suppose that for some











w h e r ew en o t i c et h a t(β − α) ∈ (0,1). From (14) we get


































which gives us (12).
Finally, to get qs
i as a function of the parameters, plug (10) into (4), under symmetry. Note
that
βΦi
n−i+1 ∈ (0,1) for each i, because 0 < β −α < 1. Rearranging (11) and (12) we obtain (1).
Lemma 3 characterizes the buyer’s expected utility as a function of parameters. The expression
Φi denotes expected future surplus to buyers due to transactions involving good i through c.T h u s
the representative buyer’s expected utility ui equals Φi divided by n−i+1, the number of remaining
buyers at the store. The seller’s equilibrium oﬀer is qi (c,n) and it leaves the buyer indiﬀerent
between accepting and rejecting.
Clearly there is a unique pair (qs
i,qb
i) for each i, thus there is a unique SPE satisfying the
two properties: stationarity and no-delay. It is easy to check that the strategies described in the
Theorem are subgame perfect. The only thing left is to demonstrate is that this is also the unique
SPE of this game, i.e., we need to show that every SPE must satisfy stationarity and no-delay.
Lemma 4 The subgame perfect equilibrium described in Theorem 1 is the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium of this game.
Proof. In the appendix.
To summarize, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, when the seller and some buyers negotiate
o v e rt h es a l eo fg o o di we have that if the seller makes the oﬀer, then the good is sold at price qi,
and if the buyer makes the oﬀer then the sale price is αqi.
2.3 Characterization of equilibrium oﬀers
It is important that we understand how oﬀers respond to changes in capacity c and realized demand
n.Aﬁr s tr e s u l ti st h a ts a l ep r i c e sr e s p o n dp o s i t i v e l y to demand pressure, so the seller can exploit
strategically his ability to constrain capacity.
Lemma 5 Equilibrium oﬀers are increasing functions of excess demand n−c.P r e c i s e l y ,f o re a c h
i =1 ,...,c with c ≤ n,t h es e q u e n c e{qi(˜ c,n)}n
˜ c=i is strictly decreasing, {qi (c, ˜ n)}∞
˜ n=c is strictly
increasing, and qi+j(c + j,n + j)=qi (c,n) for j =1 ,2,...































I nt h es e c o n dl i n ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnition of Φi (c,n). From (11) we have qi (c,n)=1 −
βΦi(c,n)
n−i+1 .
This implies that qi (c,n) >q i (c ,n) for all i ≤ c<c   ≤ n.
Now consider the eﬀect of n.L e tn  >n≥ c, then n3−i+1
n3−i+1−α < n−i+1
n−i+1−α for each i ≤ c. Thus
(12) implies Φi (c,n ) < Φi (c,n). From (11) we have qi (c,n ) >q i (c,n) for all i =1 ,...,c.
Finally, let i  = i+j, n  = n+j and c  = c+j with j =0 ,1,....N o t et h a t n3−i3+1
n3−i3+1−α = n−i+1
n−i+1−α,
n  − i  = n − i,a n dΦi3 (c ,n  )=Φi (c,n), so (11) implies qi3 (c ,n  )=qi (c,n).
When c<nthe seller is capacity constrained, so customers face consumption risk.T h i s
risk grows as c falls and n grows, i.e., as excess demand increases. In both cases buyers are willing
to trade at higher prices in any round because they are randomly selected to deal with the seller.
When there is excess demand, disagreement is costly to a buyer since it carries the risk of not
being able to buy at all in future rounds. This risk increases as n − c rises. The seller does not
face this type of risk since he trades in every round that is reached. Therefore, greater demand or
lower capacity increase the competition among buyers and so raise prices.
The central consequence is that the seller can eﬀectively increase his bargaining power by
restricting capacity, which sorts a positive eﬀect on the intensive margin. Later, we will determine
parameters such that this strategic restriction of capacity is advantageous to sellers. In that case,
ineﬃciencies will arise, due to the negative eﬀects on the extensive margin.
The last part of Lemma 5 tells us that what matters for price determination is the number of
goods left in inventory. Since, larger capacity and greater demand have opposite eﬀects on excess
demand, good i sold at a store that has excess demand n−c i st h es a m ea st h ep r i c eo fg o o di+j
sold at a store whose capacity and number of customers is also increased by j. This last fact will
be used later on. Now, instead, we establish how equilibrium oﬀers respond to changes in β and
γ,g i v e nc ≤ n.
Lemma 6 Let 2 ≤ c ≤ n. The function qi(c,n) is strictly increasing in γ for every i =1 ,...,c.
If i = c = n then qi(c,n) is strictly decreasing in β,b u ti fi ≤ c<n , then the function qi(c,n) is
U-shaped in β for all i =1 ,...,c.
Proof. We start by demonstrating that the function qi(c,n) is strictly increasing in γ for every
i =1 ,...,c. Use backward induction on i.C o n s i d e r γ ∈ (0,1).L e t i = c and demonstrate that
9∂qc(c,n)
∂γ > 0. In equilibrium we have qs





From (2) we have ∂α
∂γ > 0,s o
∂qc(c,n)
∂γ > 0. For the inductive step suppose
∂qi+1(c,n)
∂γ > 0 for some
i<c ,and demonstrate that
∂qi(c,n)






The ﬁrst term increases with α,a n ds ow i t hγ. Using the inductive step, we see that the second
term increases with γ as well, thus the result. Since qb
i = αqs
i then every equilibrium oﬀer increases
in γ.
Now, we demonstrate the second part of the lemma, on the behavior of oﬀers as β changes. It
is simple to verify that if i = c = n,t h e nβΦn = β(1 − γ) and so
qn(n,n)=1− β(1 − γ).
Therefore,
∂qn(n,n)
∂β < 0. This is the well-known case where the seller faces a single buyer.
Now consider the case c<nso that n>min Φi for all i ≤ c.F o r β ∈ (0,1),w ew a n tt o
prove that, as β grows, we have that qi (c,n) ﬁrst decreases and then increases. Referring to (11),
this is equivalent to demonstrating that
∂βΦi(c,n)
∂β > 0 when β small, and
∂βΦi(c,n)
∂β < 0 when β is
suﬃciently large. Here, Φi (c,n) is as in (12).
Notice that















































Using the Intermediate Value Theorem one can establish that ∂α
∂β ≤ 1 for β ∈ (0,x] ⊂ (0,1),
and ∂α
∂β > 1 otherwise. Notice also β ≥ α from (2). Suppose β ≤ x. Then, every term in (18) is
positive and ﬁnite. Thus
∂βΦi
∂β > 0 and so
∂qi(c,n)
∂β < 0.
Now consider β >x . The main observation is that as β → 1 we have
∂βΦi
∂β < 0. Indeed, we
have that limβ→1(1 − ∂α
∂β) < 0 and limβ→1(β − α)=0 .M o r e o v e r , s i n c e c<nthe summation





∂β > 0 for β ∈ (y,1) ⊂ (0,1) with y>x .
10Since
∂βΦi
∂β > 0 for β ∈ (0,y] and
∂βΦi
∂β < 0 for β ∈ (y,1),t h e nqi (c,n) is U-shaped in β.
Therefore, qs
i is U-shaped in β.S i n c eqb
i = αqi (c,n) and ∂α
∂β > 0, it follows that
∂qb
i
∂β > 0 whenever
∂qs
i







There are two implications. First, equilibrium oﬀers are increasing functions of γ.T h i si st r u e
for every player and for every good that is put up for sale because a greater γ improves the seller’s
bargaining power.
Second, in any round in which the seller faces multiple customers, an increase in the continu-
ation probability β lowers the seller’s equilibrium oﬀer if β is small and raises otherwise. Instead,
if the seller faces a single customer qs
i falls with β. This is interesting because a standard result
from the bargaining literature is that when there is no excess demand, i.e., when i = c = n,t h e
equilibrium oﬀer decreases with β. Instead, when i ≤ c<n ,i.e., when there is excess demand,
equilibrium oﬀers of the seller are U-shaped.
Intuitively, as β grows every player discounts less future earnings, all else equal. Thus, the
seller lowers his equilibrium oﬀer (and the buyer raises it) when β grows. This is indeed what
happens when i = n, i.e., when there is only a buyer left to trade with. However, when i<nthe
seller has excess demand so buyers face consumption risk. A buyer who does not settle the deal
today, runs the risk of being left out from the next rounds of negotiations. For example, if there
is disagreement today, the seller trades in the next round with probability β but the buyer trades
only with probability
β
n. Therefore an increase in β improves the seller’s continuation payoﬀ more
than the buyer’s, especially when n and β are large. In these circumstances, the seller can exploit
an increase in β to his advantage, raising the price.
Finally, we establish how sale prices evolve as the remaining inventory shrinks, i.e., we charac-
terize sale prices of each item according to their order of sale.
Lemma 7 The sequence {qi(c,n)}c
i=1 can be characterized as follows. It is monotonically decreas-
ing if c
n is suﬃciently close to one, it is monotonically increasing if c
n is suﬃciently close to zero,
and it is U-shaped otherwise.
Proof. Let c =2 ,..,n. F r o mt h ep r o o fo fL e m m a5w es e et h a t{Φi(c,n)}
n
c=i is a monotoni-








n−i+1 and notice that qi+1 −qi = −di+1. Using (16) in the proof of
Lemma 3 we get
di+1 = −
β−α
β(n−i) + Φi(1 − β + 1−α
n−i),







is increasing and {Φi}
c
i=1 is decreasing. Therefore {di+1}
c−1
i=1 is decreas-
ing. Thus, if di+1 < 0 then we have dj < 0 for j>i .T h a ti s t o s a y ,i f qi+1 >q i then we have
qj+1 >q j for all j ≥ i.
11Most importantly, if d2 < 0 then di+1 < 0 for all i =1 ,...,c − 1.I ti se a s yt oﬁnd conditions













Recall that α ∈ (0,1) is independent of i and c,s odi+1 increases with c.T h u s ,c o n s i d e rc =2









It is easy to see that limn→∞ d2 < 0 since the second term in the square brackets converges to a
positive constant, as n grows large. Therefore, if n is suﬃciently large and c is suﬃciently small,
we have d2 < 0 and therefore di+1 < 0 for all i =1 ,...,c−1, because di+1 falls with i.T h a ti s ,w e
need c
n suﬃciently close to zero.













We have established earlier that, for each i, di+1 increases as c grows from i +1to n. Therefore
consider c = n,s ow eh a v e
dn =
β−α










i=1 is a decreasing sequence, and di+1 increases in c, it follows that di+1 > 0 for all
i =1 ,..,c−1, when c is suﬃciently close to n. Therefore, we must have {qi}
c
i=1 is a monotonically
decreasing sequence when c is suﬃciently close to n.T h a ti st os a y ,w en e e dc
n suﬃciently close
to one.
In between these two extreme cases, there is a case when d2 > 0 but, since di+1 falls with i,
dc < 0. In this case, we have qi < 0 for i small and qi > 0 for i large. It follows from our prior
discussion that this will occur when c
n is somewhere in between zero and one.
The main result is that late buyers do not necessarily pay the highest price, when shopping at
a capacity-constrained store. Alternatively, job applicants who are hired last do not necessarily
receive the lowest wage. Whether “early birds” pay less simply depends on the severity of capacity
constraints. Indeed, prices can initially fall and rise only when the few last items are oﬀered for
sale.
We illustrate this result in Figure 1 for n =1 5 , β =0 .9 and γ =0 .1. It simulates equilibrium
sale prices in three economies with diﬀerent capacity levels, c =1 5 , 14, and 5. On the horizontal
12axis we have the diﬀerent goods i =1 ,2,..c, and on the vertical axis the corresponding sale price.
Figure 1 — Sale prices under diﬀerent inventories
When there is no excess demand, c =1 5 , prices decrease monotonically as items are sold. For
small excess demand, c =1 4 , prices initially fall in the order of sale. After the tenth item is sold,
prices start to rise. Finally, when excess demand is substantial, c =5 , prices increase as the seller’s
remaining inventory shrinks.
T h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects that inﬂuence prices as items are sold. First, buyers face trading
risk. Due to the random stopping rule buyers have an incentive to buy sooner rather than later.
When good i is oﬀered for sale we have n−i+1customers competing to buy it. The strength of this
competition is captured by the probability 1
n−i+1 of being selected to transact. This competition is
ﬁercer when i small, i.e., when the seller has sold only a small batch of his initial inventory, and it
progressively softens as items are sold since some buyers leave the store. On the other hand, when
c<nbuyers face consumption risk s i n c et h e ym a yn o tb ea b l et ob u ye v e ni ft h eg a m ed o e sn o t
stop. This risk increases as items are sold.3 The opposing inﬂuence of trading and consumption
risk varies as items are sold with the latter dominating the former when there is severe excess
demand.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. When c =1 5there is no consumption risk, but only trading
risk. As items are sold, trading risk softens and equilibrium prices fall. When c =1 4consumption
risk is small and so it is dominated by trading risk in the initial stages of the trading sequence.





n−i+1 a particular buyer will not
be selected at all to trade with the seller, even the game does not stop. Notice
n−j
n−j+1 is the probability that the
buyer is not selected by the random device (neither as a proposer nor as a responder) when negotiating over the
jth good, for j = i,..,c. Clearly n−c
n−i+1 increases with i.
13So, prices initially fall (until the tenth item) but subsequently rise. When c =5 , consumption risk
has such a dominant eﬀect that prices increase in the order of sale.
3 Endogenous Capacity
When capacity is exogenous, the bargaining outcome is eﬃcient since there are no wasteful delays,
which is in line with the existing literature. In this section, instead, we demonstrate that if the
seller can commit to an initial choice of capacity, then this may lead to equilibrium ineﬃciencies.
Therefore, consider the ﬁrst stage of the game, given the solution to the bargaining problem in
the second stage.




given that oﬀers are selected optimally in the second stage of the game, i.e., they satisfy Theorem
1. Let   c(n) denote the set of maximizers, i.e.,
  c(n)={c : c ∈ {1,...,n} and π(c,n) ≥ π(x,n) for all x =1 ,...,n}
The following theorem characterizes   c(n) as a function of the parameters.
Theorem 8 Let   c(n) denote the set of maximizers of π(c,n) and let   c ∈ {2,...,n − 1} denote a
generic interior capacity choice. We have that
  c(n)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




{  c − 1,   c} if
β
β−α = ϕ(  c,n)
{  c} if
β













β−α ≤ ϕ(n,n), then the equilibrium outcome is ineﬃcient.
The theorem establishes that the seller generally selects a unique capacity, although knife edge
cases exist in which he might be indiﬀerent between two adjacent choices. The intuition is simple.
The seller’s basic trade-oﬀ involves an extensive and an intensive margin because higher capacity
raises the expected volume of trade but lowers the unit price, as seen in Lemma 7. This suggests
that in general there is a unique capacity choice and that full capacity, c = n, is generally not the
payoﬀ-maximizing choice. Multiplicity arises due to the discreteness of the seller’s choice set.
The corollary, instead, establishes the possibility of allocative ineﬃciencies, despite the eﬃ-
ciency of the bargaining solution. Allocative ineﬃciencies depend on how bargaining power is
distributed among seller and buyers. To see why, notice that the seller oﬀers less than the market
14demands, setting c<n , whenever he has limited bargaining power. This follows immediately
from observation that limγ→0
β
β−α = limγ→0 ϕ(n,n)=1for all n and parameters exists such
that
β
β−α < ϕ(n,n) for γ close to zero. The intuition is simple. Lemma 6 has established that
every equilibrium price grows with γ, a parameter that captures the seller’s bargaining power.
Therefore, if γ is suﬃciently low, then the seller has an incentive to exploit the intensive margin
gains granted by restricting the supply to c<n . Of course, this creates an ineﬃciency because
n−c trades will not be realized. Indeed, a social planner would grant the seller enough bargaining
power to ensure that c = n is selected.
To prove this theorem we start by deriving the seller’s payoﬀ as a function of the model’s
parameters. In particular, given n, the seller’s payoﬀ π(c,n) is a step function deﬁned on the
discrete set {1,...,n}.


























Therefore, we obtain (22).






Note that ϕ(c,n) increases in c and falls in n since for all n ≥ 2 and c =2 ,...,n we have
ϕ(c,n) > ϕ(c − 1,n) and ϕ(c,n) > ϕ(c,n +1 ). (24)
The ﬁrst inequality is proved by noticing that
ϕ(c,n)=ϕ(c − 1,n) n−c+1
n−c+1−α > ϕ(c − 1,n).
The second inequality is obtained from observing that
ϕ(c,n)=ϕ(c,n +1 )
(n−c+1)(n+1−α)
(n−c+1−α)(n+1) > ϕ(c,n +1 ).
15From (22) we have
π (c − 1,n)=
 c−1
j=1 β
j−1 − Φ1 (c − 1,n). (25)
Using (12) with i =1 ,w eh a v e































In the last step we have used (12) and the deﬁnition of ϕ(c,n) from (21). Inserting this result
















I nt h es e c o n dl i n ew eh a v eu s e d( 2 2 ) .T h i sg i v e s( 2 3 ) . 
T oc o m p l e t et h ep r o o fo ft h eT h e o r e m ,w ec h a r a c t e r i z et h ec h a n g ei nπ(c,n) for a unit increment
in capacity. The main result is that, for every n ≥ 2, the change in payoﬀ strictly falls with each
increment.
Lemma 11 Let ∆(c,n)=π (c,n) − π(c − 1,n) denote the payoﬀ change from a unit increment





Therefore, for all c =1 ,..,n − 1 we have
∆(c,n) ≥ 0 ⇔
β
β−α ≥ ϕ(c,n), (27)
with
∆(c,n) > ∆(c +1 ,n). (28)
This implies that (20) deﬁnes the set of maximizer of π(c,n).
Proof. From (23) and the deﬁnition of ∆(c,n) we obtain (26). Clearly, ∆(1,n)=π(1,n) > 0
since π(0,n)=0and (27) is obvious.
To prove that ∆(c,n) is strictly decreasing in c notice that β
c−1 falls in c. From (24) in the
proof of Lemma 10 we have that ϕ(c,n) increases in c,t h u s[1 −
β−α
β ϕ(c,n)] falls in c.T h u s
∆(c,n) > ∆(c +1 ,n) for c =1 ,...,n − 1.
We use (26)-(27) to prove that (20) describes the set of maxima.
16• First line of (20). If
β
β−α < ϕ(2,n), then ∆(2,n) < 0 from (27). So, ∆(c,n) < ∆(2,n) < 0
for all c>2, from (28). Therefore, c =1is the unique maximizer of π(c,n).
• Second line of (20). If
β
β−α = ϕ(  c,n) for some   c =2 ,...,n− 1,t h e n∆(  c,n)=0from
(27). So, (28) implies that ∆(c,n) > 0 for all c<  c and ∆(c,n) < 0 for all c>  c.S i n c e
π(  c,n)=π (  c − 1,n) then there are two maximizers, {  c − 1,  c}.
• Third line of (20). If ϕ(  c,n) <
β
β−α < ϕ(  c +1 ,n),t h e n∆(  c +1 ,n) < 0 < ∆(  c,n),f r o m
(27). Again, (28) implies that ∆(c,n) > 0 for all c<  c and ∆(c,n) < 0 for all c>  c +1 .
Therefore, c =   c is the unique maximizer of π(c,n).
• Fourth line of (20). If
β
β−α > ϕ(n,n),t h e n< ∆(c,n) > ∆(n,n) > 0 for all 1 ≤ c<n .
Therefore, c = n is the unique maximizer of π(c,n).
To build intuition on how   c(n) responds to changes in the parameters, consider the simple case
with n =2 . In Figure 2 we illustrate optimal choice of capacity for diﬀerent values of β and γ.
Figure 2 — Optimal capacity when n =2 .
Optimal capacity is   c =1if γ <
3β−2
2β ,   c = {1,2} if γ =
3β−2
2β and   c =2 , otherwise. To see why,
ﬁx a low value of γ and vary β.W h e n β is small future consumption is discounted heavily and
so the seller does not gain much by constraining capacity, hence   c =2 . The opposite occurs when
β is high, and so we have   c =1 .N o wﬁx β and vary γ. The seller restricts capacity only if his
bargaining power is small, i.e., when γ is suﬃciently small. This, of course, results in allocative
ineﬃciency since the realized surplus falls by one.
Next we further discuss the allocative eﬃciency. Given demand n, the seller optimally chooses
capacity   c(n) so
  c(n)
n is the fraction of buyers who can be served. This ratio is a measure of
the level of allocative eﬃciency, since we have normalized the surplus in each match to one. To
examine eﬃciency with respect to some key parameters, such as the market size and bargaining
17skill, we simulate diﬀerent economies. The ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 3. We ﬁx β =0 .9
and let the market size n vary from 2 to 200 (the horizontal axis).The seller’s bargaining skill can
be either low γ =0 .01 or it can be high γ =0 .7.
Figure 3 — Trading Eﬃciency
As n increases, the ratio
  c(n)
n converges to a level that depends on seller’s bargaining skill γ.4 For
γ =0 .01 this is about 69% and for γ =0 .7 about 98%. Recall from earlier discussion that when
the seller lacks bargaining skills, i.e., when γ low, he has a stronger incentive to limit his capacity,
generating a loss in allocative eﬃciency. In this stylized economy, the loss from going γ =0 .7 to
γ =0 .01 is about 30%.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined short-run equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with n
identical buyers and a seller who commits to some capacity and then sells goods sequentially.
To determine sale prices we have developed a strategic process of multilateral bargaining that
involves random alternating oﬀers between a central and peripheral players.
We have found that a unique subgame perfect bargaining equilibrium exists and it is eﬃcient
since it is characterized by absence of costly delays. We have also demonstrated that the choice of
4Non-monotonicity arises because as n increases   c(n) can remain constant initially, and then rise (due to the
discreteness of seller’s choice set). For example, when γ =0 .7, we have   c(2) = 2,   c(3) = 3,   c(4) = 4,   c(5) = 4
and   c(6) = 5. The ratio equals to 1 for n =2 ,3,4,d r o p st o0.8 for n =5 , and rises to 0.83 for n =6 , and so on.
However this ﬂuctuation dies out as n grows large.
18capacity is of strategic relevance because it aﬀects the buyers’ reservation prices, hence the bar-
gaining outcome. In a nutshell, restricting capacity allows the seller to obtain more favorable terms
of trade because customers must compete with each other for scarce goods. As a consequence,
certain distributions of bargaining powers give rise to an allocative ineﬃciency. In particular, a
seller who has limited bargaining power will optimally restrict capacity to increase proﬁt. In this
case, some surplus is not realized, which results in ineﬃciency of equilibrium even if bargaining
equilibrium is eﬃcient.
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20Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
To prove uniqueness, we will demonstrate all SPE of this game must satisfy stationarity and
no-delay. The proof involves three steps following the method by [14], i.e., showing that the
supremum and inﬁm u mo ft h es e to fS P Ep a y o ﬀs coincide. As described in [12], we exploit the
stationary structure of the game. Any two subgames that start with the same player’s oﬀer (for
the ith good) are strategically equivalent. This means that the sets of subgame perfect equilibria
in such subgames are identical. Hence the sets of SPE payoﬀs to the player making the oﬀer are
the same.
Let Bk,i denote the set of SPE payoﬀs to buyer k in any subgame in which buyer k makes
an oﬀer for good i =1 ,...,c. Similarly let Sk,i denote the set of SPE payoﬀs to the seller in any
subgame starting with the seller making an oﬀer to some buyer k ∈ Ai.D e n o t e bk,i =i n fBk,i,
bk,i =s u pBk,i, sk,i =i n fSk,i, sk,i =s u pSk,i.
Notice that the sets of payoﬀsd e p e n do nk ∈ Ai because in principle diﬀerent buyers may
behave diﬀerently. Therefore, since a buyer is selected with uniform probability, we can deﬁne the
























which are conditional on the selection of, respectively, the seller and the buyer to make the oﬀer.
Therefore, the unconditional expected inﬁma and suprema of the set of payoﬀs in the subgame
where good i is sold are:
wi = γμ
i (s)+( 1− γ)[1− μi (b)]


















In any subgame in which good i is up for sale, the seller’s smallest expected payoﬀ is wi. With
probability γ he gets to make an oﬀer. The oﬀer is made to buyer j ∈ Ai with equal probability
1
n−i+1. The seller’s smallest payoﬀ in this case is sj,i and the expected smallest payoﬀ is μ
i (s).
With probability 1 − γ some buyer makes the oﬀer, and the seller’s smallest expected payoﬀ in
this case is 1 − μi (b).
In any subgame in which good i is up for sale, buyer k’s smallest expected payoﬀ is uk,i.W i t h
probability
γ
n−i+1 buyer k is in a subgame in which the seller makes him an oﬀer. This gives the
buyer at least 1 − sk,i payoﬀ. With the probability
1−γ
n−i+1 the buyer is in a subgame in which he
21makes an oﬀer. In this case his smallest payoﬀ is bk,i. With the complementary probability n−i
n−i+1
the buyer is not involved in negotiations. Since good i is sold to some other buyer, and good i+1
is put up for sale with probability β, then buyer k’s smallest expected payoﬀ is βuk,i+1.
Step 1. For all i and k ∈ Ai we have
bk,i ≤ 1 − βwi and bk,i ≥ 1 − βwi (31)
sk,i ≤ 1 − βuk,i and sk,i ≥ 1 − βuk,i (32)
To prove it start with (31). In any SPE the seller’s smallest expected payoﬀ from negotiating over
good i is wi. Therefore, if buyer k makes an oﬀer, it cannot be less than βwi (or the seller would
not accept it). Thus, the buyer gets no more than 1 − βwi. The second inequality in (31) can be
explained similarly. Now consider (32). In any subgame in which good i is put up for sale, buyer
k’s minimum expected payoﬀ is uk,i. Therefore the seller cannot oﬀer less than βuk,i and so will
gets no more than 1 − βuk,i.
Step 2. We prove that, for each player, the smallest and highest payoﬀs coincide. That is, for
all i and k ∈ Ai we have
sk,i = sk,i = qi (c,n) and bk,i = bk,i =1− αqi (c,n),
where qi(c,n) denotes the seller’s equilibrium oﬀer.
Start by noticing that, from (31) and (29) we have
bk,i ≤ 1 − β
 
γμ
i (s)+( 1− γ)[1− μi (b)]
 
for all k ∈ Ai. (33)









n−i+1 = X for X constant, since |Ai| = n − i +1 .T h e nw eh a v e
μi (b) ≤ 1 − β
 
γμ
i (s)+( 1− γ)[1− μi (b)]
 
⇒ μi (b) ≤ 1 − αμ
i (s)
given our deﬁnition of α. Using the latter inequality jointly with (33) we obtain
bk,i ≤ 1 − αμ
i (s). (34)
We can similarly establish
bk,i ≥ 1 − αμi (s). (35)
Now use backward induction on i.L e ti = c. Using (32), (30) and uk,c+1 =0we have
sk,c ≤ 1 −
βγ(1 − sk,c)
n − c +1
−
β (1 − γ)bk,c
n − c +1
.
Then considering bk,c from inequality (35) we have
sk,c ≤
n − c +1− β
n − c +1− βγ
+
αβ (1 − γ)
n − c +1− βγ
μc (s). (36)
22Since this is true for all k ∈ Ac, we take the average of both sides of (36) over all buyers in Ac.




n−i+1 = μc (s) while the right side is unaﬀected. Rearranging (36)
we get
μc (s) ≤
n − c +1− β
n − c +1− α
= qc (c,n).
This ﬁnding and (36) imply sk,c ≤ qc (c,n). We can similarly establish sk,c ≥ qc (c,n). Since
sk,c ≥ sk,c we have
sk,c = sk,c = qc (c,n).
Then (34) and (35) imply bk,c = bk,c =1− αqc (c,n) because μc (s)=μ
c (s)=qc (c,n).
For the induction step suppose it is true that sk,j = sk,j = qj (c,n) for all i +1≤ j ≤ c − 1,
and k ∈ Aj. Then it is also true that bk,j = bk,j =1− αqj (c,n), and therefore uk,j = uk,j = uj.
When j = i +1 , use (11) and (32) to get




Now we prove that sk,j = sk,j = qj (c,n) and bk,j = bk,j =1− αqj (c,n) for j = i. Using (32),
(30) we have















I nt h es e c o n dl i n ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c tt h a tuk,i+1 = ui+1 from the induction step. In the third








Since this is true for all k ∈ Ai, we take the average of both sides of (38) over all buyers in Ai.



















n−i+1 = qi (c,n).
In the second line we have used (16). Similarly we can establish sk,i ≥ qi (c,n). Since sk,i ≥ sk,i,
we have sk,i = sk,i = qi (c,n). Then (34) and (35) imply bk,i = bk,i = bi =1− αqi (c,n), because
μi (s)=μ
i (s)=qi (c,n).
Using the result in Step 2, we can rearrange (29) and (30) to obtain
wi = wi = wi = α
βqi (c,n)






23Compare these two expressions with (7) and (8) respectively. We establish that in any SPE, when








n − i +1
.
Step 3. We want to prove that in any SPE oﬀers are accepted without delay and are stationary.
We ﬁrst prove that in any SPE oﬀers are immediately accepted. Suppose we are in a subgame
in which the seller is making an oﬀer to some buyer k. The argument above shows that he must
oﬀer exactly qi (c,n)=1−
βΦi(c,n)
n−i+1 . If the buyer’s strategy is to accept any oﬀer q<q i (c,n) and
randomize when q = qi (c,n), then no best response for the seller exists. Randomization by the
buyer is inconsistent with equilibrium. A similar argument applies in any subgame that starts
with some buyer’s oﬀer. We now prove that oﬀers are stationary. From Step 2 it is obvious that
whenever the seller gets to make an oﬀer, he proposes qi (c,n) and whenever a buyer in Ai makes
an oﬀer he proposes αqi (c,n). This completes the proof of uniqueness.
24